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"Comparable worth" has been described as a legal theory, an eco-
nomic theory, the looniest idea since "Looney Tunes," as difficult to
define as love, creeping socialism, certain communism, and as a lively
topic for discussion at a dinner party. The most frustrating element in
any discussion of "comparable worth" is that there seems to be as many
definitions of "comparable worth" as there are people discussing it.
Thus confusion has become the rule of the day. The debate began in
1962-63 when Congress was considering the passage of what is now
known as the Equal Pay Act' which, as originally proposed, included a
provision mandating payment of equal pay for comparable worth.
When Congress decided that there was no way to define "comparable
worth" the legislation was amended to read "equal pay for equal work."
In 1979, Professor Ruth G. Blumrosen, a consultant to the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and a professor at Rutgers Uni-
versity, published an article in which she contended that men and wo-
men often do different jobs and that the wage marketplace is infected
with sex discrimination resulting in lower earings for women. 2 The
remedy she proposed was to have the court appraise the "worth" ofjobs
and then compel employers to pay wages comparable to such "worth."
This article is an attempt to describe the "comparable worth" or
pay equity" debate as it has evolved over the past twenty-three years
both in the courts and in the legislatures, both state and federal, as they
responded to disparity between the wages of men and the wages of
women.
The presence of wage disparities, on average, between male and
female employees in the United States is an indisputable fact. 3 Propo-
* Partner, Epstein Becker Borsody & Green, Los Angeles Office; formerly Vice
Chairman and Commissioner, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington,
D.C., 1981-84. The author gratefully acknowledges the research and writing assistance of
Gerald P. Cunningham, an associate with Epstein Becker Borsody & Green.
1. Equal Pay Act of 1963, enacted as § 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
2. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399 (1979).
3. The type of statistics most often cited by proponents of comparable worth is:
"full-time working women earn 61 cents for every dollar earned by males." See, e.g., NA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, THE WAGE GAP: MYTHS AND FACTS (1983). This figure
varies depending upon the source used. For example, the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission ("EEOC") commissioned a study by the National Academy of Sciences
which stated that women of "all races" earned 55.3% of the earnings of white men in
1978. This figure included full-time civilian workers 18 years old and over. NATIONAL
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nents of the theory of "pay equity" or "comparable worth" believe, in
essence, that men and women must be paid equally for jobs of "compa-
rable worth" to the employer. 4 Despite the failure of comparable worth
theorists to consistently and rationally define the concept which they vo-
ciferously propound, 5 their objectives have been: expansion of Title
V116 and Equal Pay Act concepts to include intentional sex discrimina-
tion based upon an employer's failure to pay equal rates forjobs of com-
parable worth to the employer's operation, 7 and introduction of
legislative initiatives 8 which mandate the application of comparable
worth to the operations of public and private employers.
The linchpin of comparable worth theory is the oft-cited earnings
gap between the wages of men and women. The theory is based on the
existence of discrimination which underlies this earning gap.9 Propo-
nents of "comparable worth" or "pay equity" argue that wage dispari-
ties should be eliminated through enforcement or adoption of
antidiscriminating legislation. 10 It is, however, not necessarily true that
all wage disparities within an employer's workforce are the result of sex-
RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 13
(1981) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES]. For the final quarter of 1983, the
average female worker earned approximately 66.2% of the earnings of the average male.
R. WILLIAMS AND L. KESSLER, A CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH 6 (1984). See discus-
sion infra notes 14-22.
4. The Supreme Court expressly declined to consider comparable worth in County
of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). The Court did, however, describe com-
parable worth as the "controversial concept . . .under which plaintiffs might claim in-
creased compensation on the basis of a comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty of
their job with that of other jobs in the same organization or community." Id. at 166
(footnote omitted).
5. This shortcoming has been criticized in many quarters. See LIVERNASH, AN OVER-
VIEW, IN COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 8 (ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALIENATIONS] ("comparable worth has not been opera-
tionally defined by its supporters").
6. Title VII of the Civil Rights Action 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). The Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), is available for suits against governmental
agencies. See Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984) (Municipal Lighting Commis-
sion failed to upgrade salary of female manager and her assistant despite adoption of a
report rating plaintiffs position as either equal or similar to managerial positions held by
men).
7. This approach has been consistently rejected by the courts. For a complete dis-
cussion of the applicability of Title VII to cases involving comparisons of dissimilar jobs,
see infra notes 76-128 and accompanying text.
8. See discussion of current legislation initiatives infra notes 63-75 and accompany-
ing text.
9. The conclusion of the National Academy of Sciences study commissioned by the
EEOC, see supra note 3, was: " . . . [D]iscrimination, as the term is used in this report,
does not imply intent but refers only to outcome. Wage discrimination exists insofar as
workers of one sex, race, or ethnic group are paid less than workers of another sex, race or
ethnic group for doing work that is of 'comparable,' that is, equal, worth to their em-
ployer." WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 91. See also Blumrosen, supra note 2,
at 400. ("[Tlhe low rates of pay associated with such segregated jobs constitute the major
explanation for the 'earnings gap' between minority and female workers on the one hand
and white males on the other. This gap has long been considered a major benchmark as to
the extent of employment discrimination"). Id. at 400 (footnote omitted).
10. Statements on Pay Equity: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. I reprinted in DAILY LAB. REPORT. (BNA) No. 70, at G-4, 6-9 (May 11, 1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hearings] (statement of Brian Turner on behalf of National Committee on Pay
Equity) ("[w]ithout Congressional insistence on the appointment of officials strongly com-
[Vol. 62:2
SEX-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION
based discrimination in compensation or in personnel policies. If the
relative and established values of employee positions are reflected in a
nondiscriminatory fashion, by an employer's pay structure, then the al-
teration of that pay structure under the guise of "equal pay for compara-
ble worth" would be merely a pretext for other objectives. Under
present law, a strictly legal analysis would not conclude that an employer
must alter its pay structure to equalize pay rates,'' Employers are not
legally responsible for historical discrimination against women in em-
ployment, nor are they responsible for societal attitudes which may have
resulted in a devaluation of occupations traditionally dominated by wo-
men. Indeed, it is widely held, the comparison of dissimilar jobs cannot
form a basis for a successful suit for discrimination based on sex.
The supporters of comparable worth, however, do not rely upon a
strictly legal analysis, but also propound an economic approach: a sys-
tem of values must be applied to each of an employer's job functions so
as to establish a ranking ofjobs on an "objective" basis. Such a ranking
system is purported to be a more equitable manner of establishing pay
rates and would result in the elimination or reduction of the wage dis-
parities between men and women. 12 In understanding this economic
approach, it is necessary to realize that the legal aspects of comparable
worth center upon employer discrimination while the economic aspects
center upon the elimination of wage disparities. It is also necessary to
realize that the vehicles used by proponents of comparable worth, for
the elimination of wage disparities, are the current and proposed em-
ployment antidiscrimination laws.
This article does not suggest that the narrowing and ultimate disap-
pearance of the wage gap between men and women is not an appropri-
ate goal but, rather, that employment discrimination laws are an
inappropriate vehicle for the achievement of that goal. Federal and
state employment discrimination laws are designed to eliminate discrim-
ination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age,
handicap, and veteran status. The laws mandate equality of treatment of
all employees through the elimination of nonmerit criteria from the per-
sonnel and compensation decision-making process. The emphasis advo-
cated under a system of comparable worth, in the application of
employment anti-discrimination laws, would shift the focus from the in-
dividual and the equal treatment of individuals' 3 to a focus upon equal
mitted to upholding the law, the wage gap will continue to exist, and, in fact, may worsen")
(emphasis added).
11. A prima facie violation of Title VII does not exist where men and women receive
different compensation for different skills when these skills do not command an equal rate
in the labor market but may be, at least subjectively, of equal value to the employer. Chris-
tensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977). For a full discussion of Title VII and
comparable worth theory, see infra notes 76-130 and accompanying text.
12. The NRC Study concluded, "[i]n our judgment job evaluation plans provide
measures of job worth that, under certain circumstances, may be used to discover and
reduce wage discrimination for persons covered by a given plan." WOMEN, WORK AND
WAGES, supra note 3, at 95.
13. The Supreme Court has reiterated that the emphasis in Title VII is upon the indi-
vidual. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-54 (1982) ("The principal focus of the
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rates for all classes. When equality of opportunity for individuals is re-
placed with equality of achievement for groups, employers are no longer
being enjoined from discriminatory practices, but become instruments
through which social change is implemented. This is precisely the posi-
tion in which the acceptance of the comparable worth theory would
place employers: the wage rates of jobs in which women predominate
would be raised where the employer is paying men a higher rate for
doing work of "comparable value." Eradicating sex discrimination will
be replaced with the social goal of eradicating widespread pay
disparities.
This article analyzes the proposed use of the comparable worth the-
ory, within the framework of federal employment discrimination law, as
the basis for eliminating pay disparities between men and women. First,
the various economic and sociological arguments propounded by both
comparable worth proponents and opponents are summarized. Second,
the proposed legislative initiatives, on both the state and federal levels,
are set forth. Third, the eradication of sex-based wage discrimination
through utilization of current law is discussed, along with the viability of
comparable worth under Title VII and availability of a marketplace de-
fense. Finally, some practical steps for employers are outlined which
could help to avoid potential liability under the expansion of anti-dis-
crimination laws.
I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
A. Job Segregation and Differentials in Pay
The labor force in the United States is in large part still segregated
by race and by sex. Women predominate the clerical and service occu-
pations and men predominate the craft and laboring occupations.1 4 Ac-
cording to 1970 Census Bureau figures, of 553 occupations, 310 have at
least 80% male incumbents, and 50 have at least 80% female incum-
bents. 15 Over half (54%) of working women are in occupations domi-
nated by women; 70% of working men are in occupations dominated by
men. 16 Sex segregation by occupation has decreased over the past sev-
eral decades. 17 The increases of the number of women in certain jobs
has been dramatic: female lawyers and judges (124% increase)18 , physi-
statute is on the protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of the
...group as a whole.")
14. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 25.
15. Id. at 28.
16. Id. The National Committee on Pay Equity has cited more recent figures. "In
1982, more than half of all employed women worked in occupations which are 75% fe-
male, and 22% of employed women were in jobs that are more than 85% female." Hear-
ings, supra note 10, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 70, at G-4 (May 11, 1984).
17. See generally Lloyd, The Division of Labor Between the Sexes: A Review, in SEX, DISCRIMI-
NATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 1 (C. Lloyd ed. 1975); Cohen, Sex Differences in Compen-
sation, 6 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 434 (1971). See also Hedges & Bemis, Sex Stereotyping: Its
Decline in Skilled Trades, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (BNA), at 14 (May 1974).
18. Nelson, Opton and Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in
Perspective, 13 U. MicH.J.L. REF. 233 n.2 (1980). The number of female lawyers and judges
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cians and osteopaths (97% increase), 19 and bank officials and financial
managers (111% increase). 20 Between 1970 and 1979, for each increase
of ten in the number of females in clerical positions, the number of wo-
men in managerial positions increased by four. 2 1 Occupational segrega-
tion by sex, however, has "barely decreased at all among whites over the
past several decades.
' 22
The indisputable facts remains that occupational segregation by sex
remains a steady, albeit shifting, trend in the United States. Further-
more, women tend to work in occupations which pay less on the average
than occupations dominated by men.
A recent Rand Corporation study concluded that the average wage
of all women has increased much faster than the average wage of men
during the last 60 years. 2 3 Since 1980, women's hourly wages have risen,
on average, from 60% to 64% of those of men: the largest gain in this
century.24 Between 1980 and 1984, the average hourly wages of wo-
men, adjusted for inflation, rose 3.3 percent whereas the wages of men
declined by three percent. 25 The average wage gains of younger women
during this short period are more striking: in 1980, women 20 to 24
years old earned 78% as much as men in the same age category and by
1983 this proportion had risen to 86%.26 Additionally, the hourly
wages of black women have increased 47% more rapidly than those of
white men, narrowing the proportion of wages earned from one-third to
57%.27 For the remainder of the century, wages of women will acceler-
ate relative to those of men-by the year 2000, relative wages of women
who entered the labor market in the 1970's should rise roughly 15%
faster than those of similarly situated male workers. 28 The Rand Corpo-
ration study conservatively estimates that the overall average wages of
working women will be at least 74% of the overall wages of working men
by the year 2000.29
Proponents of comparable worth argue that the presence of job
segregation based on sex and the concomitant wage differentials are the
result of discrimination. 30 The wage gap, however, has never been
proved to be the result of discrimination. This debate continues, and
rose from 13,000 1982 in 1970 to over 60,000 in 1979. COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 20.
19. Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 18, at 233 n.2.
20. Id.
21. COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 20.
22. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 25.
23. J. SMITH & M. WARD, WOMEN'S WAGES AND WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY Vi
(1984).
24. Id. at ix.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 26.
27. Id. at ix.
28. Id. at 75. This estimate is probably too conservative insofar as it assumes a con-
stant commitment to the labor market which is expected to expand for that group over the
next several decades. Id. at 75-76.
29. Id. at 82.
30. "Jobs traditionally held by women-in so-called women's work-pay less, regardless
of the skills and expertise required." Hearings, supra note 10, reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA)
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the studies cited vary in conclusions depending upon the which side of
the "comparable worth debate" the source stands. Wage differentials
between men and women are not clearly related to segregation patterns,
and thus the question can be put more precisely: are the lower wages
paid for jobs dominated by women lower because women occupy the
positions? The studies are inconclusive. It is clear, however, that nu-
merous factors must be taken into account when an attempt is made to
determine the origins of the pay disparities between men and women.
Critical considerations include: employee qualifications (seniority and
experience, skills and abilities, education and training); employee work
behaviors (performance, absenteeism, turnover, hours worked, i.e., part-
time or full-time and hours per week); union membership; specific tasks
and behaviors required as part of an occupational category; the size,
profitability and wage policy of particular employers and industries; de-
tailed aspects of labor market conditions and regional differentials; mar-
ital status, family background, history of relocation and age. 3 1 Such
considerations are not generally taken into account by most studies of
the origins and causes of the "wage gap."
Another often neglected factor is that of the risk of accident or in-
jury within a particular job classification. The element of risk is taken
into account in the establishment of pay rates, and men, to a much
greater extent than women, are in jobs which have a higher risk of acci-
dent or injury. This risk factor alone may account for as much as six
percent of the "wage gap."
3 2
It is an elementary statistical observation that "statistical correla-
tions, such as that between salary and sex, do not imply causal infer-
ences, such as the inference of discrimination."'3 3 Indeed, although
comparable worth proponents often cite studies comparing segregated
job groups, this may not be a valid approach to measuring discrimina-
tion. Discrimination should be studied by comparing similarly situated
men and women, rather than attempting to devise an analysis of discrim-
ination practices by comparing segregated occupations and pay levels.
34
Since most statistical studies attempt to compare "segregated" oc-
cupations, it should be noted that such studies never have been able to
isolate the extent to which wage disparities are the result of discrimina-
No. 70, at G-5 (statement of Brian Turner on behalf of the National Committee on Pay
Equity).
31. See Milkovich, The Emerging Debate, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNA-
TIVES, supra note 5, at 45. (In his paper, the Emerging Debate, Professor Milkovich assem-
bled the possible determinants of pay differences between men and women into a table in
order to discuss the complexities of wage comparison.).
32. Finn, The Earnings Gap and Economic Choices, in EQUAL PAY FOR UNEQUAL WORK 101,
110 (P. Schafly ed. 1984).
33. Roberts, Statistical Biases in the Measurement of Employment Discrimination, in COMPARA-
BLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 178.
34. Id. at 195. See also R. WILLIAMS & L. KESSLER, Looking Behind the Day Gap Statistics,
in A CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH 15-25 (1984) (documenting deficiencies in vari-
ous statistical studies of the (pay gap)); Blumrosen, supra note 2, at 445 ("[O]ne's choice of
variables, in fact, can eliminate discrimination completely.").
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tion or of other factors. 35 Although the extent of the "pay gap" cited by
commentators varies widely, 36 much of the "pay gap" can be accounted
for on the basis of nondiscriminatory factors.
Studies have not significantly taken into account a central and
hardly quantifiable factor: employee choice. Certainly women will tend
to be over-represented in lower paying jobs as a result of choices made
within numerous societal constraints; however, employers are not le-
gally responsible under anti-discrimination laws for those constraints.
Advocates of comparable worth have noted the difficulty in assessing
"the relative importance of the choices women make in the labor market
and of the factors affecting their choices."'3 7 Although it would be spuri-
35. Nelson, Opton and Wilson, supra note 18, at 253 ("[T]he most that multiple re-
gression analysis can tell us is that some of the gross earnings differences between the
sexes are accounted for legitimately, while the remainder must result from unmeasured
legitimate sources, and/or job separation, and/or from wage discrimination."); Hearings,
supra note 10, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 70, at G-2 (wages of single men compared with
wages of single women demonstrated a wage disparity but the disparity was justified) (tes-
timony of Cotton M. Lindsay).
36. Indeed, the studies of the wage gap have reached different conclusions. As one
commentator summarized: "[e]ven the gross wage gap-the hourly earnings differential
before adjusting for diverse characteristics-varies from study to study, ranging from 45 to
47 percent depending on the type of population considered. Studies based upon national
samples covering the full age range tend to show a gross wage gap of 35 to 40 percent.
Studies based on more homogenous groups, such as holders of advanced degrees or those
in specific professions, have found considerably smaller gross wage gaps." O'Neill, An
Argument Against Comparable Worth, in JUDICIAL WAGE DETERMINATION . . . A VOLATILE
SPECTRE 29 (1984).
37. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 53. The description contained in this
study of the determinants of female choice in the decision to take a type of job is
noteworthy:
It is sometimes asserted that women choose to work at certain types of jobs de-
spite the fact that such jobs have relatively low pay rates. A variety of reasons has
been offered. First, women may be socialized to believe that some types ofjobs
are appropriate and that others are inappropriate for women; socialization may
be so effective for some women that it never even occurs to them to consider
other types of jobs. Second, women may have pursued courses of study they
thought particularly appropriate to women and in consequence may not have the
education or training that would suit them for other available jobs. Third, wo-
men may lack information about other available jobs, their pay rates, working
conditions, and access to them. Fourth, women may be aware of alternatives, but
because of actual or expected family obligations may structure their labor force
participation in particular ways. For example, they may be unwilling to invest a
great deal of time, effort, or money in preparing for jobs because they do not
expect to remain in the labor force after marriage or childbearing. They may be
willing to accept low paying jobs, or jobs with limited opportunities for advance-
ment, and hold them until they marry and begin to raise children. Or, in expecta-
tion of returning to work after their children are in school or grown, they may
choose jobs that are easy to leave and re-enter, jobs that do not require the con-
tinuous accumulation of skills and consequently do not lead to significant in-
creases in earnings with experience (citation omitted). To accommodate the dual
demands of work and family responsibilities, women may choose jobs with lim-
ited demands-restricted hours, no overtime work, no travel requirements, etc.
Or they may defer to the demands of their husbands' career advancement, mov-
ing with their husbands from place to place, etc. (citations omitted). Some of
these family related factors may influence women's willingness to pursue ad-
vancement in their jobs. Fifth, women may be aware of alternative types ofjobs
but believe them to be unavailable or unpleasant because of discrimination; their
labor market preparation and behavior may be affected in many ways by this per-
ception: the course of study they take; the time, money and effort invested in
training; their willingness to accept promotion, etc.
1985]
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ous to argue that the factor of employee choice is the determinant factor
in the creation and maintenance of a work force which contains segre-
gated job patterns, it represents a major factor unaccounted for in the
comparable worth proponents' presumption that the much heralded
"wage gap" is predominantely a result of discrimination by employers in
the setting of wages.
In sum, supporters of comparable worth have not proved an under-
lying and basic premise of their argument, viz, that the wage gap is a
product of employer discrimination in the setting of wages and must
therefore be remedied by anti-discrimination laws.
38
B. The Role of the Marketplace
Proponents of comparable worth would replace marketplace deter-
minations of wages with job evaluation studies which evaluate different
jobs according to an "objective" set of standards. A standard for job
evaluation studies will necessarily have to be created so that there will be
uniformity in the results of those studies. One of the underlying
problems with the comparable worth theory is the enormous practical
problem it creates in terms of implementation. An equitable pay setting
system, according to proponents of the theory, would exist if a mecha-
nism is utilized which would evaluate the "worth" of jobs to employers
without regard to sex or the marketplace. Indeed, the market place is
seen as perpetuating the effects of past discrimination and therefore as
an invalid measure of job worth. 39 Another rationale for ignoring the
marketplace function for the setting of wage rates is the observation that
market forces are not "pure" in wage setting, particularly in the area of
collectively-bargained wage rates. 40 Proponents of comparable worth
by definition assume that either the marketplace is perpetuating the ef-
fects of past discrimination 4 or that all wage differentials derived from
Id.
38. The district court in Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982)
summarized the above argument as follows:
I find unpersuasive the basic premise that Blumrosen [supra note 2] or any one
possesses the intellectual tools and data base that would enable them to identify
the extent to which the factor of discrimination has contributed to, or created,
sex-segregated jobs, and to separate that factor from the myriad of nondiscrimi-
natory factors that may have contributed to the same result.
Id. at 444. The court noted:
Among others, these contributory factors would include familial and peer expec-
tations, desire for part-time work or work with flexible hours, reluctance to pio-
neer in non-traditional fields, the absence of'role models' in non-traditional jobs,
and lack of information about higher paying jobs.
Id. at 444 n.6. See O'Neill, An Argument Against Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH:
IssuEs FOR THE 80's (A Consultation for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights) 179-83
(1984).
39. See Hearings, supra note 10, reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 70, at G-7 (pay-
ing market rates "does not reflect the value of the job relative to other jobs in the same
firm and may well reflect prior discrimination by other employers or by society as a





the market arise from wage discrimination. 42
Implicit in the proponent's theory is the assumption that the mar-
ketplace determines wage rates based on noncompetitive factors, 43 or
that even if competition is present, the wages of women in predomi-
nantly female job classifications will be kept at a lower level precisely
because of the sex of the incumbents, i.e., women have been and con-
tinue to be discriminatorily barred from other positions and therefore
there is an oversupply of labor for female dominated job classifica-
tions.4 4 It is further assumed that wage differentials become customary
and are reproduced throughout a given labor market (whether regional
or national).45
One basic problem with any theory which emphasizes that the
"worth" of ajob classification should be set by an evaluation system and
not by market rates is that the market system already recognizes the rela-
tive worth of various job classifications. Indeed, proponents of compa-
rable worth assume that there is an objective hierarchy ofjob worth, but
that women in female dominated job classifications are not paid on the
basis of this objective hierarchy. 4 6 Clearly "institutional" factors influ-
ence wage rates without a direct connection to the labor market. Such
factors include policies of promoting from within and collective bargain-
ing agreements. 4 7 The present market system determines wages by re-
lating particular talents of employees and potential employees to the
demands of business and consumers. 4 8 Although the market system is
inperfect according to classical economic theory, the valuation of job
"worth" (defined basically by the assigned wage) clearly takes into ac-
count the basic values which a comparable worth system would, such as
skills, education, experience and working conditions. The present wage
system has the additional advantage of flexibility in changed conditions,
whether in the supply of, or the demand for, particular skills. An admin-
istrative approach, such as that envisioned by proponents of comparable
worth, would lack such flexibility, aside from the issue of whether it is
42. G. Hildebrand, The Market System, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNA-
TIVES, supra note 5, at 101.
43. Id. at 82.
44. Id. at 87. The "exclusion" theory is further amplified in WOMEN, WORK AND
WAGES, supra note 3, at 55.
45. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 61. "By use of the 'going wage' as a
standard to set pay rates, the wages of a (nondiscriminating) firm will be biased by the
discrimination of other firms in the market."
46. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 118 (minority report by Ernest J.
McCormick).
47. The writers of the National Research Council study added "the segmentation of
labor markets into noncompeting groups, largely on the basis of the sex, race and ethnicity
of workers" is an additional institutional constraint. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note
3, at 45.
48. See O'Neill, supra note 36, at 28-29. The labor market has been defined as "the
generic term for a value system rooted in the hierarchy of skills, effort, responsibility, and
work activities (and to some extent working conditions) that comprise jobs, and the supply
and demand forces that operate as organizations and workers compete in our economy."
WOMEN, WORK AND \VAt;S. supra note 3, at 118 (minority report). The labor market al-
ready takes into consideration the "objective" factors purported to be the basis of the
grand job evaluation scheme envisioned by comparable worth proponents.
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proper for the government to administer a wage-rate setting program
designed to ignore market forces.
4 9
C. Job Evaluation Studies
A serious problem involved with the implementation ofjob evalua-
tion studies on a grand scale is that any company which does not set pay
levels which are closely aligned with the prevailing conditions in the ex-
ternal labor market and the product market is going to be unable to
compete. 50 Job evaluation studies if performed under a comparable
worth mandate would ignore such considerations.
The orientation of job evaluations is internal by definition and
under a comparable worth approach would deliberately avoid the mar-
ket as a determinant of wages. Basically, job evaluation is "a procedure
that makes judgments about jobs based on content or the demands
made on job incumbents." '5 1 Afterjob descriptions are produced pursu-
ant to a job analysis, a list of "compensable factors" is chosen which
represents values which an organization chooses to reward. The job de-
scriptions are evaluated in terms of the extent of compensable factors
present within that job classification, and a pecuniary hierarchy ofjobs is
established. 52  As this description demonstrates, the employer con-
ducting ajob evaluation presently has a scale of values which it wishes to
implement and uses ajob evaluation study to establish a pecuniary hier-
archy in terms of those values. Adjustments are then made according to
external labor market rates.53 The values underlying the job evaluation sys-
tem are dictated by the particular business needs of the employer, and
are therefore also subject to change. 54 Presently these value scales are
set by the employer if comparable worth is mandated, then such values
must be legislatively derived and applied to different types of employers
with different strategies with respect to recruitment and retention of em-
ployees. Even proponents of comparable worth admit that the values
are subjectively derived. 5 5 In practice, the comparable worth theory
would require that "worth" be established to a legal certainty5 6 and
would require either a comprehensive legislative mandate establishing
the national economic importance of a value or an ad hoc judicial deter-
mination of this value.
49. See Williams and Kessler, supra note 34, at 40-41.
50. G. Hildebrand, The Market System, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNA-
TIVES, supra note 5, at 95.
51. Schwab, Job Evaluation and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices, in COMPARABLE
WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 57.
52. Id. at 58.
53. Address by Robert E. Williams to the American Arbitration Association (Jan. 23,
1984), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 16, at F-I Uan. 25, 1984).
54. Id.
55. See WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 96. ("[Tlhere are no definitive tests
of the 'fairness' of the choice of compensable factors and the relative weights given to
them. The process is inherently judgmental and its success in generating a wage structure
that is deemed equitable depends on achieving a consensus about factors and their weights
among employers and employees").
56. See supra note 53, at F-2.
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Additionally, job evaluations are inherently subjective procedures
requiring discretion and judgment in their implementation. 5 7 This
raises the problem of the reliability of the job evaluations with respect to
two areas. First, the job description which forms the basis of the job
evaluation varies depending on the person conducting the analysis, in
part because most job analyses are narrative verbal descriptions. 58 Sec-
ond, the actual numerical rating process is so inherently subjective that
different raters will often produce different evaluations. 59 The subjectiv-
ity of the job evaluations system militates against its application by way
of a legal mandate. Again, the worth of a job would have to be estab-
lished to a legal certainty and under current methods of job evaluation
this cannot be achieved. 60 Corporate consultants who are charged with
the task of performing corporation-wide job evaluation studies have
stated that such studies emphasize the differences among jobs, and that
no job evaluation system has been established which could implement a
comparable worth mandate, which emphasizes the similarities between
disparate jobs.
6 1
The adoption of such a subjective system of wage setting would
necessarily fail to meet the purported purpose of a system of compara-
ble worth. It may narrow or even eliminate the wage gap existing in an
individual employer's workforce but it would not establish the same
rates of pay between different employers because the economic condi-
tion of each employer must, by necessity, dictate how much capital is
available for payment of wages.
II. LEGISLATION: CURRENT AND PROPOSED
A. State Developments
The concept of comparable worth as a legislative mandate is not
new: twenty states62 currently have statutes prohibiting unequal com-
57. Schwab, Job Evaluation and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices, in COMPARABLE
WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 59-60.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 60-61.
60. See Nelson, Opton and Wilson, supra note 18, at 255. ("Job evaluation systems are
basically methods for systematizing and recording subjective judgment, and at each stage
in the process-job analysis, job description, selection of compensable factors, weighting
of compensable factors, and the selection of the breadth ofjobs to which a particular sys-
tem will be applied-the necessarily subjective judgments inevitably incorporate individual
and societal biases.").
61. See, e.g., BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, PAY EQurrY AND COMPARABLE WORTH 82-83
(1984) (description ofjob evaluation program utilized by Control Data Business Advisors,
Inc.) [hereinafter cited as PAY EQUITY AND COMPARABLE WORTH].
62. These states include Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Minnesota, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington and West Virginia. PAY EQ-
UITY AND COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 61, at 55-56. For example, the Idaho statute
provides: "No employer shall discriminate between or among employees in the same es-
tablishment on the basis of sex, by paying wages to any employee in any occupation in this
state at a rate less than the rate at which he pays any employee of the opposite sex for
comparable work on jobs which have comparable requirements relating to skill, effort and
responsibility." IDAHO CODE § 44-1702(1) (1977).
19851
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
pensation for "comparable work" or work of "comparable character"
which cover employees both in the private and public sectors, 63 or man-
date studies of the feasibility of comparable worth in government jobs.
64
Indeed, approximately thirty states have set up task forces, special com-
missions or other procedures to evaluate jobs or recommend specific
actions to state governments. 6 5 For example, a 1982 Minnesota statute
provides for "equitable compensation relationships between female-
dominated, male-dominated, and balanced classes of employees in the
executive branch."'6 6 The Commissioner of Employee Relations is
charged with biannually compiling a list of those state civil service units
within the different municipalities where compensation inequities exist
based on comparability of the value of the work. An estimate of the
appropriation necessary for providing comparability adjustments will
also be prepared and a commission on employee relations shall review
and submit a list of comparability adjustment areas and a recommended
appropriation. 6 7 In Minnesota, 9000 employees were determined to
have been eligible for comparability adjustments totaling $26 million, or
approximately 4 percent of the state payroll.
6 8
Twenty-one state legislatures considered some form of comparable




Numerous comparable worth initiatives were propsed in the House
and Senate in 1983-1984, and although none were enacted, it is certain
that these proposals foreshadow statutes on the legislative horizon.
Therefore, a brief look at some of these proposals is necessary.
Senate Bill 1900 ("The Pay Equity Act of 1983") was introduced in
1983 by Senator Alan Cranston of California. The EEOC would have
been charged with the task of publishing guidelines aimed at "discrimi-
natory wage setting practices," i.e., compensation practices where fe-
male dominated jobs are paid less than male dominated jobs "although
the work performed requires comparable education, training, skills, ex-
perience, effort and responsibility, and is performed under comparable
working conditions. . .. ." The EEOC would also have had to study
"equitable job evaluation techniques and aid employers" in utilizing
63. PAY EQurrY AND COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 61, at 55.
64. The California statute, for example, states that: "it is the intent of the legislature
• ..to establish a state policy of setting salaries for female-dominated jobs on the basis of
comparability of the value of the work." The Department of Personnel Administration is
charged with reviewing and analyzing "existing information, including those studies from
other jurisdictions relevant to the setting of salaries, for female-dominated jobs." CAL.
GOV'T. CODE § 19827.2(b) (West Supp. 1984).
65. Chi, Comparable Worth in State Governments, 27 STATE GOVERNMENT NEWS 4 (Novem-
ber, 1984).
66. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.01(3) (West Supp. 1984).
67. Id.
68. PAY EQuITY AND COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 61, at 59.
69. Id. at 61-68.
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such techniques. The EEOC would also have had to study the federal
employment system to determine whether it is equitable. Furthermore,
federal contractors would have been required to identify "discrimina-
tory wage-setting practices and differentials" and include proposals for
their elimination in the contractor's affirmative action plan. Compliance
review would have be undertaken where a contract had not utilized "eq-
uitable job evaluation techniques."
The Federal Pay Equity and Management Improvement Act of 1984
passed the House of Representatives in June of 1984, but was not acted
upon in the Senate before the end of the 98th Congress. This proposal
would apply comparable worth theory to federal employees. 70 The Bill
defines a "discriminatory wage-setting practice" as one where the pay
rates for predominantly female positions are lower than those for
predominantly male positions, although "the work performed . . . in-
volves comparable duties, responsibilities, and qualification require-
ments and is performed under comparable working conditions. ' 7 1 The
elimination of "discriminatory wage differentials" would occur through
"equitable job evaluation techniques," i.e., a job evaluation system
which establishes a numerical point value for each job.7
2
The president of the Marine Engineer's Beneficial Association 73 op-
posed this proposal, saying it would replace collectively bargained wage
rates for blue collar workers with a combination white collar-blue collar
evaluation. He opposed any system which would ultimately have the
effect of lowering blue collar wages.
74
III. CURRENT LAW
A. County of Washington v. Gunther
In County of Washington v. Gunther,75 the Supreme Court held that the
standard of "equal or substantially equal" work as set forth in the Equal
Pay Act 76 need not be met where a claim of sex-based wage discrimina-
tion is brought under Title VII. 7 7 The case involved direct proof of in-
70. H.R. 5680, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in PAY EQUITY AND COMPARABLE
WORTH, supra note 61, at 139.
71. H.R. 5680, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(4) (1984).
72. H.R. 5680, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(6) (1984).
73. jesse M. Calhoon, President, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO.
74. See Calhoon, Comparable l1'orth and the Role of Collective Bargaining, in JUDICIAL WAGE
DETERMINATION. . .A VOLATILE SPECTRE, supra note 36, at 42. ("What this all boils down
to is that collective bargaining in the Federal sector will soon cease to have any meaning.
Once comparable worth policies are implemented, and Federal employees are all covered
under a so-called 'objective' system, there will be no room for negotiation over salaries.
One way, and only one way, will be the 'right' way to compensate employees. We will be
substituting the opinion of 'expert' evaluators for the hard-won victories of collective
bargaining.").
75. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
76. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1982)).
77. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982). Section 703(h)
of Fitle VII (the Bennett Amendment), provides that it not unlawful to differentiate upon
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tentional sex discriminations. The County of Washington, Oregon had
paid substantially lower wages to female correction officers in the female
section of the county jail than it had paid to male correction officers in
the male section of the jail. Four female correction officers brought suit
alleging that the County had intentionally discriminated against the fe-
male officers by setting the pay scale for female officers, but not for male
officers, at a lower rate than was warranted by the County's own survey
of outside markets and the worth of the jobs. The Court specifically
stated that the claim by the female guards was "not based on the contro-
versial concept of 'comparable worth.' "78 The study conducted by the
County had determined that the female officers should be paid approxi-
mately 95 percent as much as the male officers, whereas the female of-
ficers were thereafter paid 70 percent. This intentional discrimination
suit, the Court stated, "does not require a court to make its own subjec-
tive assessment of the value of the male and female guard jobs, or to
attempt by statistical technique or other method to quantify the effect of
sex discrimination on the wage rates." 79 In Gunther, therefore, the door
was opened for sex-based wage discrimination suits which compared the
compensation levels of dissimilar jobs; however, the Court by no means
endorsed comparable worth as a viable theory under Title VII.
B. Reliance Upon the Marketplace as a Title VII Defense
Employers, when faced with a Title VII sex-based wage discrimina-
tion suit, may assert the defense established by the Equal Pay Act that
the pay differentials are based "on any factor other than sex."8 0 A criti-
cal issue is whether reliance upon the marketplace in the setting of
wages constitutes a defense under Title VII. 8 1 In Spaulding v. University
of Washington,8 2 members of a predominantly female nursing faculty al-
leged sex discrimination in the setting of salaries for the various aca-
demic departments.8 3 At the outset, the Ninth Circuit considered the
plaintiff's claims under the disparate treatment model of sex discrimina-
the basis of sex in determining wages if such differentiation is "authorized" by the Equal
Pay Act. The employer's position in Gunther was that the Bennett Amendment incorpo-
rates into Title VII only the affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act, and not the equal
pay for equal work standard.
78. 452 U.S. at 166.
79. Id. at 181. Seealso Heagney v. University ofWashington, 642 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th
Cir. 1981) (an in-depth analysis of salaries paid to exempt employees indicating that more
female than male exempt employees were underpaid should have been admitted into evi-
dence by district court).
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(i) (1982).
81. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of the Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense
Fund at 15-22, AFSCME v. Washington, No. 84-3569 (9th Cir.) (extensive discussion of
marketplace defense).
82. 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984).
83. Plaintiffs in Spaulding asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Equal Pay Act,
and Title VII. The Ninth Circuit found the district court lacking in jurisdiction over
§ 1983 since the University of Washington is a state agency. With respect to the Equal Pay
Act claims, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court's findings as to the lack of substantial
equality ofjob content. Id. at 694, 699.
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tion.8 4 Recognizing that under this model plaintiffs must ultimately
prove intent to discriminate, the court stated that Gunther did not require
an inference of such intent where wage differences exist between similar
jobs.8 5 But the court did find that the comparibility of jobs can be rele-
vant in determining whether a court can infer discriminatory animus.
8 6
The court rejected plaintiffs' attempt to support a prima facie case of
disparate treatment by an asserted failure by the University to cooperate
in the investigation of the initial discrimination charge, its asserted fail-
ure to appoint experienced women's rights advocates, the all-male com-
position of the budget committee,8 7 an alleged disdain for women's
issues,8 8 and faulty gross comparisons of wages in other departments.8 9
The plaintiffs also claimed that the disparate impact model applies to
sex-based wage discrimination claims,9 0 and that the University could
not rely upon a "competitive marketplace" defense.9 '
The Ninth Circuit, following two circuit court opinions discussed
below, Lemons v. City and County of Denver9 2 and Christensen v. State of
Iowa,9 3 held that disparate impact analysis is not appliable to a compara-
ble worth claim,9 4 and, therefore a prima facie violation of Title VII may
not be made out by utilizing disparate impact analysis. 95 The disparate
impact model "was developed to handle specific employment practices
not obviously job-related" 9 6 and is not "the appropriate vehicle from
which to launch a wide ranging attack on the cumulative effect of a com-
pany's employment practices." 9 7 The plaintiffs sought to establish the
University's policy of relying on the market to set its wages as the facially
neutral policy which had a discriminationory impact upon the nursing
faculty. The court found however that the University's reliance upon
the market was not the type of employer policy which is appropriate for
disparate impact analysis. 98 Employers "deal with the market as a
'given,' and do not meaningfully have a 'policy' about it in the relevant
84. 740 F.2d at 700.
85. The "nursing faculty must show 'proof of actions taken by the employer from
which we infer discriminatory animus ....' " 740 F.2d at 700 (quoting Furnco Constr. Co.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978)).
86. 740 F.2d at 700-01.
87. Id. at 701-02.
88. Id. at 702.
89. Id. at 704.
90. The applicabiliiy of disparate impact theory to sex-based wage discrimination
claims is discussed more fully in notes 92-99 in&ra.
91. 740 F.2d at 692.
92. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
93. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
94. 740 F.2d at 708. ("We cannot manageably apply the impact model when the ker-
nel of the plaintiff's theory is comparable worth.").
95. 740 F.2d at 707.
96. Id. Namely, employer's intelligence tests and height and weight tests. See, e.g.,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602
(9th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983).
97. Id. (quoting Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir.
1982)).
98. 740 F.2d at 708.
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Title VII sense." 99
An earlier Eighth Circuit case cited by the Ninth Circuit in Spaulding,
Christen v. State of Iowa, 100 involved a class of female clerical employees at
the University of Northern Iowa who contended that clerical workers, all
of whom were female, were discriminated against on the basis of sex
since the predominantly male physical plant workers were paid more.
Wages were determined at the University under ajob evaluation scheme
which referred to the market only after a point-rating system had placed
jobs in particular "labor grades." The local job market paid higher
wages for physical plant jobs than starting pay under the job evaluation
scheme, so starting pay for physical plant employees had been adjusted
upwards.' 0 1 Plaintiffs argued that the University's reliance upon local
wage rates to establish the higher starting pay perpetuated sex discrimi-
nation in the marketplace. 10 2 The court logically rejected this finding
and held that Title VII does not require employers to "ignore the mar-
ket in setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications."10 3
In Lemons v. City and County of Denver,10 4 the Tenth Circuit was faced
with a comparable worth claim brought by nurses employed by the City
of Denver. Wage rates were set according to a method which placed city
nurses on a pay parity with other nurses in the community. 10 5 Plaintiffs
argued that the City should not mirror the prevailing market condition
of underpaying nurses. The nurses sought wage comparison with other
jobs alleged to be of equal worth to the employer. The Tenth Circuit,
following Christensen, stated that current law did not require the City to
"reassess the worth of services in each position in relation to all others
.... 106 The court added that such a reassessment would not be tol-
erated when made in total disregard of conditions in the community. 10 7
In essense, employers are not required under Title VII to ignore the
marketplace in the establishment of wage rates.
In Briggs v. City of Madison,'0 8 plaintiffs were female public health
99. Id. See also Note, Sex-Based tVage Discrimination Under the Title 1/I Disparate Impact
Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1083 (1982) (discussion of comparable worth and disparate im-
pact analysis).
100. 563 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1977).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 356.
103. Id. See also Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 822 (1982) (recognizing legitimacy of marketplace-based differentials in
the context of comparisons of salaries of faculty members in different professional
schools); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 15 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 914 (W.D.N.C.
1976), ayfd, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977) (marketplace consid-
erations constitute "legitimate factors"); County Employees Ass'n. v. Health Dep't., 18
Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1538 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (pattern of historical discrimina-
tion does not justify comparable worth claim under state anti-discrimination law where
employer adopted the wage scales of the marketplace).
104. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
105. Id. at 229.
106. Id. The Tenth Circuit's rationale was buttressed by the Ninth Circuit's emphasis
in Spaulding that "[clourts are not competent to engage in a sweeping revision of market
wage rates." 740 F.2d 686, 706 n. 11.
107. 620 F.2d at 229.
108. 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
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nurses employed by the City of Madison who claimed sex discrimination
under the disparate treatment theory. The plaintiffs alleged that they
were discriminated against by the City's practice of paying lower salaries
to female public health nurses than to male public health sanitarians.
Plaintiffs contended that much of the pay disparity could be traced to an
historical devaluation of the worth of female dominated jobs. 10 9 Plain-
tiffs further contended that the worth of nurses and sanitarians was sub-
stantially similar in skill, effort, and responsibility. The plaintiffs sought
a wage comparison even though the two jobs did not involve perform-
ance of the same or equal work.' 0 In finding that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate intentional illegal discrimination, the court stated that
nothing in Title VII "indicates that the employer's liability extends to
conditions of the marketplace which it did not create."l I I
In sum, the courts recognize that an employer's reliance upon the
marketplace in the setting of wage rates is not indicative of an intent to
discriminate on the basis of sex and is a factor "other than sex," consti-
tuting a defense to a disparate treatment claim. Furthermore, it is inap-
propriate to use disparate impact theory to establish a prima facie Title
VII case by wholesale assaults on employer wage-setting policies.
C. AFSCME v. State of Washington
In AFSCME v. State of Washington,' 12 the State of Washington con-
ducted job evaluation studies with the intent of examining, on the basis
ofjob worth, the salary differences between predominantly male and fe-
male job classes. Four such studies were conducted between 1974 and
1980. Job classes were assessed on the basis of the four components of
"knowledge and skills," "mental demands," "accountability," and
"working conditions." The final point value of each class was the total
of the value of these four components.' 13 The studies did not, there-
fore, reflect market forces, although a state statute provides that wages
of public employees are to reflect prevailing rates in the public and pri-
vate sectors. 1 14 The district court found that the State of Washington
had discriminated against females on the basis of sex under disparate
109. Id. at 437.
110. Id. at 442.
111. Id. at 447. "That there may be an abundance of applicants qualified for some jobs
and a dearth of skilled applicants for other jobs is not a condition for which a particular
employer bears responsibility." Id. See Horner v. Mary Institute, 613 F.2d 706, 714 (8th
Cir. 1980) (part of differential in pay between male and female physical education instruc-
tors due to marketplace considerations constituting a factor other than sex under the
Equal Pay Act). See also Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 480 (8th Cir.
1984) (upholding finding that market factor increases given by University to faculty mem-
bers in five traditionally all male disciplines was necessary to maintain a strong faculty in
those disciplines despite discriminatory impact of the awards); Schulte v. State of New
York, 533 F. Supp. 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); Mosely v. Kellwood Co., 27 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 32, 348 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (recognizing importance of the role of the market
in setting of wages).
112. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
113. Id. at 865 n.9.
114. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28B.16.110, 41.06.160 (1982).
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impact theory, by utilizing its present system, and under disparate treat-
ment theory by implementing and perpetuating the present system." 15
The case, according to the district court, concerned with implementa-
tion of a comparable worth compensation system, but did not require
the court to make its own subjective assessment of the worth of particu-
lar jobs,' 16 and therefore could be "more accurately characterized as a
straightforward 'failure to pay' case."'' 17
The district court analogized its "failure to pay" characterization of
the case before it to County of Washington v. Gunther.'1 8 The differences
however between the two cases were not recognized by the court. In
Gunther, the narrow issue before the court was whether a claim of inten-
tional discrimination could be brought and proved by direct evidence
which proved that the wages of female correction officers, but not male
officers, were intentionally set at a lower level than the State's own job
survey warranted.' 19 In Gunther, the Supreme Court decided that such
an intentional failure to pay case could be brought under Title VII, but
the Court provided that no standards were set forth for such cases.
120
The district court in State of Washington erred by relying upon Gunther for
the proposition that a failure to implement a job evaluation study is it-
self a Title VII violation. Furthermore, the Gunther study took into ac-
count market factors, whereas the State of Washington study did not.
Therefore, the defendant in State of Washington should have been able to
assert reliance upon the marketplace as a defense. The district court,
however, found that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case and pre-
cluded the State from demonstrating that no discrimination occurred,
limiting defendants to such proof as would justify the discrimination
"established" by the prima facie case.' 2 ' The district court would not
allow defendants to introduce evidence demonstrating the state's reli-
ance on prevailing market wages. 122 Since reliance upon the market-
place constitutes "a factor other than sex" and therefore a defense to a
sex-based wage discrimination claim,' 2 3 the state was clearly prejudiced
by the district court's refusal to admit such evidence.
124
115. 578 F. Supp. at 864.
116. Id. at 862.
117. Id. at 865.
118. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 181 ("[W]e do not decide in this case the precise contours of lawsuits chal-
lenging sex discrimination in compensation under Title VII."). Courts have noted the
limited holding in Gunther. The Fifth Circuit has stated that the Supreme Court in Gunther
"was concerned with blatant cases of sex discrimination in which the only stumbling block
to underpaid females' causes of action was the fact that the victimized women did not hold
jobs similar to those held by men." Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th
Cir. 1983).
120. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 34-38,
Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511
(1984).
121. 578 F.2d at 857.
122. Id. at 863.
123. See supra notes 81-110 and accompanying text.
124. The district court refusal to allow defendants to demonstrate that no discrimina-
tion had occurred, rather than merely to justify the discrimination "proved" by the prima
facie case, led the court to exclude relevant evidence. "Included among the evidence not
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The district court concluded that plaintiffs had established a prima
facie case of disparate treatment by showing that the state had intention-
ally implemented and perpetuated a compensation system which re-
sulted in unfavorable treatment of employees in predominantly female
job classifications. 12 5 The "failure to pay," was only one factor relied
upon by the court in finding the intentional discrimination necessary to
establish disparate treatment. The factors cited by the court included
the perpetuation of the disparity in salaries between female and male job
classifications rated as having the same point value; statistical evidence,
including an inverse correlation between the percentage of women in a
classification and salary; subjective standards with a "disparate impact"
on predominantly female jobs; admissions by the state officials of dis-
criminatory wage setting practices; and the failure to pay the evaluated
worth as established by the job evaluations.' 2 6 In reaching a finding of
disparate treatment, the court relied upon factors inextricably tied to the
concept that discrimination exists in the failure to pay particular job
classification wages commensurate with the job evaluation point values
assigned to a particular job.' 2 7 The "admissions" of state officials of
disparate treatment 12 8 were actually recognitions of the disparity in pay
between predominantly female and male jobs;' 29 such a disparity, how-
ever, must be shown to be the result of intentional employer discrimina-
tion to be part of a cognizable legal claim under Title VII. Ultimately,
the court held the State of Washington bound by the findings of the job
evaluation studies that disparities existed between predominantly fe-
male and male wage rates. The court implicitly held that the state was
bound for Title VII to implement the results of the job evaluation stud-
ies and to ignore the marketplace, although the setting of the wage rates
in itself was not proved to have been motivated by discriminatory
intent. 
3 0
allowed were testimony and exhibits as to why the State did not implement the internal
comparability studies; why the State felt it necessary and appropriate to rely on prevailing
market rates; and the extensive affirmative action efforts undertaken by the State." Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 37, AFSCME v. Washington,
578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), appeal docketed No. 84-3569 (9th Cir.). Despite these
evidentiary rulings, the district court concluded: "Defendants failed to produce credible,
admissible evidence raising a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against
the Plaintiffs herein." Id. at 863. The court later stated: "[In fact, there is no credible
evidence in the record that would support a finding that the State's practices and proce-
dures were based on any factor other than sex." Id. at 866. But for the court's evidentiary
rulings, the record would have reflected the State's reliance on several factors other than
sex, including the arguably complete defense of reliance upon the marketplace.
125. 578 F. Supp. at 864.
126. Id.
127. "The evidence in the instant case is clear ... that the State was on notice of the
legal implications of conducting comparable worth studies without implementing a salary
structure commensurate with the evaluated worth of jobs." Id. at 870.
128. "[Rlecognition of disparate treatment by responsible State officials" constitutes
"perhaps [the] most telling" circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination. Id. at
858.
129. Statements included: "There are clear indications of pay differences between
classes predominately held by men and those predominately held by women within the
State svsteis. Such differences are not due solely to job 'worth.' " Id. at 860-61.
130. ' 'hie State was entitled to conduct as many advisory studies as it wanted, but it
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D. Summary
Intentional sex-based wage discrimination may be remedied cur-
rently under either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. 13 1 Under neither
statute may a claim of sex-based wage discrimination be brought, how-
ever, where plaintiffs assert than an employer is not paying the employ-
ees in a job classification the intrinsic "worth" of their jobs.
132
Moreover, employees should not be held to be legally bound to imple-
ment the results of a job evaluation study, as the employer would be
under no duty to conduct such a study in the first place. Certainly, no
employer should be held liable for a failure to implement a job evalua-
tion scheme unless substantial evidence supports a finding of discrimi-
natory intent.
IV. UNION LIABILITY FOR SEX-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION
Several unions in the public and private sectors support the compa-
rable worth theory and intend to pursue "equity" increases at the bar-
gaining table. Although the future of comparable worth rests in large
part on the success of public and private sector unions at the bargaining
table, 13 3 the potential liability of unions for successful claims against
employers is barely acknowledged. Unions may be liable if it is found
that a collective bargaining agreement contained discriminatorily set
wage rates for predominantly female job classifications under present
anti-discrimination laws and may also share responsibility with employ-
ers should comparable worth theory be legislatively mandated in the
future.
Union liability stems from three federal statutes: Title VII, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),
134 and under section 1981.135
Under Title VII and section 1981, the union may be held jointly liable
for negotiating a collective bargaining agreement which contains dis-
had no legal obligation to abandon its existing market-based pay system simply because
some studies of internal comparability showed that a different method of valuing jobs
would be more favorable to employees in predominantly female classifications. This is not
a 'failure to pay' case, because the State had no obligation to pay employees in accordance
with the (job evaluation] studies and there is no evidence that the State ever failed to pay women
based on the same criteria that it used in paying men." Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employ-
ment Advisory Council at 9-10, AFSCME v. Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash.
1983), appeal docketed, No. 84-3569 (9th Cir.) (emphasis supplied).
131. See, e.g., International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec., 631 F.2d
1094 (3d. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981) (employer allegedly set wage rates
lower for any classification if the group covered within that category was predominantly
female although jobs were evaluated as equivalent under employer's evaluation study).
132. Comparable worth theory has been rejected as a cognizable claim under Title VII
by several district courts. See e.g., Connecticut State Employees Ass'n v. Connecticut, 31
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33, 528 (D. Conn. 1983); Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp.
721, 726-27 (W.D. Mich. 1982); Martin v. Frontier Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 510 F.
Supp. 1062, 1067-68 (W.D. Okla. 1981); Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 501 F. Supp.
1300, 1320 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
133. See PAY EQUITY AND COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 61, at 91 (statement of Ron-
ald Green).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
135. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
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criminatory wage rates or other policies and practices. 136 Under the
NLRA, the union may have breached its of the duty of fair representa-
tion by invidiously discriminating against its members.
137
A union may clearly be held to have violated Title VII by negotiat-
ing for, or acquiescing in, the setting of discriminatory wage rates. 138
Indeed, Title VII imposes an affirmative obligation on the part of inter-
national unions and other umbrella organizations to take reasonable
steps to end discrimination, and an International may be held jointly
liable with its Local for discriminatory practices. 139 In light of a union's
potential liability under Title VII for sex-based wage discrimination
claims, either under a "joint negotiator" theory or a "failure to take af-
firmative steps" theory, it is clear that the acceptance of the comparable
worth doctrine either under present law or as a modification of present
law has substantial negative economic implications for unions, thus mili-
tating against the acceptance of any broad-ranging support for compara-
ble worth by the labor movement.
In addition, an aggrieved plaintiff asserting sex-based wage discrim-
ination under Title VII or section 1981 could also simultaneously seek
relief under the NLRA.1 40 Such an aggrieved plaintiff could assert that
the union has breached its duty of fair representation, ajudically-created
obligation under the NLRA prohibiting arbitrary, discriminatory or bad
faith conduct by a union towards a member of the collective bargaining
unit. 14 1 A charge could be brought to the National Labor Relations
Board, or a suit instituted against the union, asserting a combination of
theories, including breach of the duty of fair representation under the
NLRA and causes of action under Title VII and section 1981.142
Although several unions, particularly in the public sector, are
strong advocates of comparable worth theory, two important factors
may tend to diminish broad-ranging support in the labor movement.
First, unions would be potentially liable for any discrimination found.
Second, if comparable worth theory were legislatively mandated, the
freedom of unions to negotiate would be severely restricted and a major
role in the wage-setting process now performed by unions would be-
136. See Note, Union Liability For Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REv. 702 (1980).
137. Id. See also Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(union has duty to protect employees from employer discrimination by bargaining).
138. See Taylor v. Charley Bros. Co., 25 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa.
i981), wherein the union was held to have violated Title VII by agreeing to, and encourag-
ing, the setting of discriminatory wage rates in negotiations in 1974 and 1977, and by
acquiescing to the employer's proposals in 1980. Id. at 614.
139. Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 143,
146 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (restriction of females to single job classification and failure to allow
females to "bump" males with less senority during lay-off pursuant to provisions of collec-
tive bargaining agreement). See also Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.
1977) (union local violated Title VII by refusing employer's offer to retroactively eliminate
discriminatory pay dilferentials); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, In-., 478 F.2d 979,
988-99 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
140. Cf Alcantar v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
141. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
142. See generally United Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NI.RB, 368 F.2d 12, 24 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
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come redundant due to extensive government involvement in the wage-
setting process.
V. CONCLUSION-METHODS OF AVOIDING LIABILITY
Employers, both in the public and private sectors, are well-advised
to implement policies and programs designed to avoid liability under
comparable worth theory. Despite the fact that courts have not been
receptive towards acceptance of the doctrine under current anti-discrim-
ination laws, state and federal legislative developments indicate that
those employers not presently subject to comparable worth statutes will
be in the future.
A. Self-Analysis
Comparable worth statutes, in order to be implemented, are and
will be administered by governmental fair employment agencies. Much
as current equal employment opportunity laws depend upon employer
self-analysis, (e.g. affirmative action programs), so too will employer
self-analysis be the basis for governmental comparable worth efforts.
Predominantly-female job classifications, (generally, where seventy-per-
cent or more of the incumbents are female), are the targets of compara-
ble worth advocates. Employers must establish whether predominantly
female job classifications are present in the workforce. If such classifica-
tions exist, transfer and promotion procedures must be examined to de-
termine whether female employees are encountering illegal barriers.
Employers should actively encourage women in such job classifications
to move into other positions. Any steps taken towards this end should
be documented, including offers of transfer or promotion, so that a rec-
ord of the employer's good faith efforts to remove obstacles to the trans-
fer and promotion of women is established. Hiring procedures and
recruitment methods must be examined to determine why the workforce
has developed female or male dominated job classifications. To the ex-
tent the employer has the ability to discourage sex-based hiring pat-
terns, it should do so. This may take the form, for example, of active
recruitment of females for male-dominated job classifications.
B. Jlage-setting Policy
The employer's wage-setting policy must be uniform and non-dis-
criminatory. Ad hoc increases, either to individuals or for employees
within a given job classification, should be carefully reviewed and docu-
mented. Certain inconsistencies in wage-setting policies will be una-
voidable, such as where a portion of the workforce is part of a collective
bargaining unit or where a true "merit" system applies. One of the most
significant problems employers have in defining a "merit" system is




If there is any evidence of intentional discrimination either in set-
ting wages by classifications or among individuals, the employee should
consider appropriate action to remedy the bias. Such evidence may in-
clude a practice of basing starting salaries on the amount earned by ap-
plicants in prior employment instead of the entry salary set by company
policy.
C. Surveys
The ultimate burden as to the conduct and implementation of any
marketplace survey or job evaluation survey rests with the employer.
Because of the very nature of such surveys there will be portions which
will be subjective rather than objective. In constructing such a survey,
the employer should take all steps possible to assure that the study is not
affected by intentional employment discrimination. This can be done by
selecting for review jobs which include both male and female employees
wherever possible and in which the lines for job progression are such
that movement to and from such jobs is not affected by factors which
might indicate employment discrimination. One of the most crucial du-
ties of employers is to closely monitor the conduct of the job evaluation
or wage survey. It is folly to presume that those conducting such a sur-
vey do not make mistakes or are without bias. The role of counsel in this
process is a crucial one in that the employers should be advised before,
during and upon completion of a salary survey of the legal ramifications
of the conduct of the survey and any decisions made as to implementa-
tion or non-implementation of any findings. The decision-making pro-
cess as to any salary adjustments should be as extensively documented
as possible both with respect to marketplace factors which would affect
the salary levels paid for various positions as well as the economic condi-
tion of the company vis-a-vis its ability to pay increased salaries.
The above recommendations apply with equal force to job classifi-
cations dominated by any protected class. The comparable worth de-
bate currently centers on women, although in practice, application of
the theory will not be so limited in scope.
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